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ACTUAL MALICE TEST
bear the burden of the security's becoming inadequate at any time for
any reason. Since placing the risk of inadequate security at the time of
sale on the mortgagee would not further the anti-depression goal, the
court may have found purposes for section 580b not articulated in prior
decisions. While it is possible to draw some conclusions about the ef-
fects of the decision on the mortgagee's position, it is not possible to say
whether a provision making mortgagors responsible for damage to the
security from third parties or natural calamity would be valid.
An authority on the law of mortgages has observed that "[i]n all
legal systems there seems to be in the law of mortgages an evolution from
a forfeit-idea in which the res is given as conditional satisfaction of some
act for which there is no personal duty (at least not one for which there
is a direct action) to a security idea."33 This evolution has been due
mainly to the skill of drafters of mortgages and other security agreements
who, typically, are the lenders or their representatives. The California
court's treatment of the anti-deficiency judgment statute has reversed the
trend. The mortgaged real estate is no longer simply a convenient method
for the lender to collect what is owed him, but a device for limiting the
borrower's liability in loan transactions involving the sale of real estate.
The facts that in the typical mortgage the lender is a professional and
the borrowed an amateur, that the lender often is in the better bargaining
position, and that the market is sometimes lacking in competitiveness
may have influenced the reasoning that brought the court to this position.
It is the court's view that these considerations influenced the legislature
in enacting the statute. But the presence or absence of these facts in the
individual case is now irrelevant, the determination having been made in
advance for the whole class of such cases in favor of the borrower.
Thus, California has again given special encouragement to buyers of
land, and in doing so has apparently revived an earlier view of the mort-
gage relation.
STEPHEN MASON THOMAS
Torts-A Clarification of the Actual Malice Test
In a recent libel case, St. Amant v. Thompson,1 a majority of the
Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified, but declined to expand, the "reck-
G. OSBORNE, MOJGAGES, § 13, at 31 (1951).
390 U.S. 727 (1968), rev'g 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967).
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less disregard" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' In New
York Times the Court, stating that the first and fourteenth amendments
afford a qualified privilege to the maker of certain libelous misstatements
of fact,' held that a false statement of fact relating to the official conduct
of public officials is not actionable unless it is made with "actual malice-
that is knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."' The Court in St. Amant refined this vague actual
malice doctrine and formulated distinct guidelines to help determine the
evidentiary criteria constitutionally necessary to support a finding that
a publication was made with actual malice.'
New York Times established two methods by which the evidentiary
requirements of the actual malice test could be satisfied." The first, ac-
tual knowledge, is easily applied.7 But the application of the second
method-showing reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a state-
ment-is more difficult. The first effort to clarify the New York Times
"actual malice" standard occurred in Garrison v. Louisiana,8 where the
Court expressly rejected the common law test of "ill will."" Requiring a
"high degree of awareness"'10 of the probable falsity of a statement, the
Court defined actual malice basically in terms of scienter" and stated
that mere negligence or unreasonableness in making a false statement will
2376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'The Court expressly adopted the view of the minority of state courts. 376
U.S. at 280-81. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312
P.2d 150 (1957); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Annot.,
150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
'376 U.S. at 279-80. An interesting part of the New York Times decision,
the "public official" doctrine, is beyond the scope of this note. For examples, see
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th
Cir. 1965); Fignole v. Curtis Publ. Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Comment, Constitutional Law-Defamation--Privilege to Comment on Official
Condiuct Extended, 46 BosT. U.L. REv. 568 (1966); Comment, Defamation of a
Public Official, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 356 (1967). For a discussion of the
extension of the public official concept to the "public figure," see Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Afro-American Publ. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Anendnment, 55; GEo.
L.J. 234 (1966); Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-
Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE L.J. 642 (1966).
'390 U.S. at 728.
a 376 U.S. at 279-80.
' See Fox v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563, 221 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935
(1966).
'379 U.S. 64 (1964).
'Id. at 72.
'ld. at 74.
" See Hanson, Developments in the Law of Libel: Impact of the New York
Times Rule, 7 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 215 (1966).
ACTUAL MALICE TEST
not support a slander action by a public official. Nor will evidence of
personal malice, or evidence that the misstatements affected the of-
ficial's private reputation support it.'2 The holding in Garrison suggests
that the defendant had a "general intent to make a false comment."' 3
Following New York Times and Garrison, numerous state and fed-
eral courts attempted to interpret the constitutional standard of reckless
disregard. Lower court holdings generally used either the amount of the
defendant's investigation of the source of his information or the inher-
ently improbable nature of the information itself14 as determinative. A
conflict arose as to whether evidence of the defendant's investigation of
his source was decisive. For example, the Third Circuit held that "inves-
tigatory failures are insufficient to show recklessness on the part of a news-
paper."' 5 However, the Seventh Circuit held there was sufficient evidence
to go to the jury on the question of reckless disregard where defendant
magazine published an article, based on the Civil Rights Commission Re-
port, stating that the plaintiff was brutal to Negroes, when in fact the
report only indicated it had been alleged.' 6 The inherently improbable
character of the libelous information was a determinative factor in other
attempted definitions of reckless disregard. Motive to injure alone, that
is, that the remark was incited by a prior grudge' or a desire to defeat
a candidate,'8 was held not to constitute reckless disregard.
In St. Amant, the defendant in a televised political campaign ad-
dress had charged the plaintiff with criminal conduct. Although the de-
fendant failed to investigate the reliability of his charges, which were
false, the Court held that the plaintiff had not satisfied his burden of
proving that the statements were made with a "reckless disregard" for
the truth.'" The decision specifies that the fact finder must determine
whether the publication was "indeed made in good faith."2 To satisfy
constitutional requirements, the evidence must be sufficient "to permit the
12 379 U.S. at 73, 76-77.
"8Note, Constitutional Law--Freedom of Speech-Defaimation, 39 TuL. L.
REv. 355, 360 n.38 (1965).
14 See Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., 389 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1967).
' Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1968).
10 Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909
(1966). For other examples in which investigation was important, see Ross v.
News-Journal Co., - Del. - , 228 A.2d 531 (1967); Silbowitz v. Lepper, 55
Misc. 2d 443, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1967).1 Manbeck v. Ostrowiski, 384 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
10 Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150 (1957). The
court applied a standard similar to that in New York Times before that decision
was announced.
10 390 U.S. at 728.
20Id. at 732.
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conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice."'" The
Court further pointed out that not every uncontradicted assertion of good
faith will guarantee a verdict for the defendant.'
Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for ex-
ample, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of
his imagination or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous tele-
phone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher's
allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man
would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be
found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports.
23
The first two illustrations in the quoted passage indicate that if the
defamatory publication has no source-neither an informant nor a fact
situation of which the defendant has personal knowledge-a jury will be
permitted to find reckless disregard. The Court implies that allegations
by the plaintiff must be countered with positive evidence by the defendant
that the statement was not a product of his imagination nor from a totally
unknown and unverified source. If the source of the alleged defamation
lies in some factual occurrence, the plaintiff then appears to have the
burden of showing that only a reckless man would draw and publish such
deductions from the situation, or that the defendant possessed knowledge
sufficient to make his inference either recklessly or knowingly false. In
other words, the deductions must be so improbable that the jury will be
permitted to find by implication the scienter required by Garrison. If the
defendant shows that the information came from an informant, the burden
again shifts to the plaintiff. He must show either that there are obvious
reasons for doubting the veracity of the informant, for example, by the
reporter's past record of reliability,24 or that the statements themselves
are so "inherently improbable" that only a reckless man would publish
them. St. Amant implies that this inherent improbability may be estab-
lished in either of two ways: the plaintiff must establish that knowledge
contrary to the alleged defamation is so widely held that only a reckless
man could publish it or that the defendant himself possessed facts from
which the jury could find scienter.
2 Id. at 731 (emphasis added).221d. at 732.
231d.
2 See Washington Post Co. v. Koegh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
25 390 U.S. at 732.
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The Court's treatment of the evidence in St. Amant suggests that the
emphasis by lower courts on the importance of investigation was mis-
placed, for evidence of investigation and of the nature of the defendant's
statements are no longer the primary determinants of the standard of
reckless disregard. These factors now seem to be of significance only as
evidence tending to show the defendant's doubt as a matter of fact. It
further seems that by allowing a factual determination of doubt to be
inferred from the evidence, the Court is possibly retreating from the New
York Times requirement of proof of reckless disregard with "convincing
clarity."2
St. Amant establishes some needed guidelines by its examples in which
the Court recognizes that reckless disregard may be inferred from the
facts. But the catch-all of "inherent improbability" that follows the ex-
amples leaves the test of reckless disregard a still uncertain concept. The
Court in effect replaces the illusive reckless disregard standard with a
new label-inherent improbability. It admits that the standard of reck-
less disregard "cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition.
' 27
Despite these lingering uncertainties, the Court rejects the absolutist
standard of Justices Black and Douglas," proving many of the early
commentators and speculators wrong2 9 The actual malice standard was
initially established in New York Times by balancing opposing societal
interests. The Court continues to recognize that although there is "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"" there still remains
a "pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation."" The Court has apparently decided that in relation to
public issues the actual malice prerequisite retains a constitutionally ade-
quate measure of protection for reputation and good name. There is
little reason to expect sweeping changes in this field in the near future.
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
20 376 U.S. at 286.
", 390 U.S. at 730.
" See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1964) (concurring opinions).
20 See Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234
(1966); Note, Criminal Law-Criminal Libel-Constitutional Limitations on
State Action, 14 Amt. U.L. REv. 220 (1965); Note, The New York Times Rule
and Society's Interest in Providing a Redress for Defamatory Statements, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 424 (1967); Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-
Defamation, 39 TUL. L. REv. 355 (1965); Note, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
-(84 S. Ct. 710)-The Scope of a Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 106 (1965)."0 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
" Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
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